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The U.S. Justice Department filed suit against the National Association 
of Broadcasters (NAB) in 1979, charging that the NAB Television Code 
damaged commerce by restricting the supply and raising the price of 
television advertising. Federal District Court Judge Harold Greene 
issued a consent decree in 1982, under which provisions the NAB 
eliminated Television Code sections regulating televisioncommercials. 
The NAB case is an interesting and important subject for study~ For 
one, the NAB case shares characteristics with the historic antitrust case 
against AT&T. Both cases were adjudicated byJudge Greene, who took 
an active stand against the activities of a pervasive communications 
medium. Further, both cases were settled by a consent decree whose 
impact on consumers was uncertain at the time of the case and remains 
in dispute. 
The nature of the television product also makes studying the 
antitrust case interesting. Commonly in antitrust cases, colluding firms 
are accused of conspiring to restrict the output or raise the price buyers 
face. The usual welfare economics argument shows how society fails to 
exploit all potential gains from trade because total output is less than is 
socially optimal. In the case of television, however, broadcasters 
provide a public good to viewers without charging a direct fee and earn 
revenue by selling commercial time to advertisers. The connection 
between restrictions on commercials and consumer welfare is not so 
obvious as in the usual antitrust cases. Further, although they would 
not want broadcasters to collude and raise prices for commercial time, 
advertisers are surely sensitive to potential dilution of their messages 
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because of excessive commercials on programs and so might favor 
some limits on commercials. 
Congress is considering restricting the amount of commercial 
material during children's programs ("Children's Television," 1988). 
Theserestrictions, supportedbyorganizationslike Action for Children's 
Television, are exactly the same as those eliminated from the NAB Code 
(NAB, 1981, XIV, 2, c). The effect of such regulation on stations and 
viewers can be evaluated fairly only after analyzing the effects of the 
NAB's Television Code. 
This article examines the NAB's Television Code and its suspen­
sion from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint, concluding 
that the consent decree was at best unnecessary and at worst ill advised. 
The next section provides some background on the NAB, the Television 
Code, and the antitrust case. The third section presents statistical 
evidence that the code did not directly significantly increase television 
station profit. The fourth section reviews reasons why stations would 
adopt a code and considers some welfare implications of a successful 
code. 
The NAB Code 
The National Association of Broadcasters is the primary industry trade 
association. The NAB provides technical assistance, managerial con­
sulting, and industry lobbying. Before Judge Greene's decision, the 
NAB issued voluntary radio and television codes. 
The Television Code, administered by the NAB Code Authority, 
contained both ethical provisions and advertising restrictions. The 
ethical provisions prohibited advertisements for hard liquor, guns, and 
some other products, and provided standards for a variety of activities 
including payments by advertisers for displaying products within 
programs. 
The code's advertising rules set maximum limits for minutes of 
commercials, number of commercials, and number of commercial 
interruptions. Separate limits applied to prime-time programs, to 
children's programs, to some other types of programs, and for network 
affiliates. Multiple product announcements were prohibited (NAB, 
1981). The Code Authority monitored and encouraged subscriber 
compliance and had the power to expel from the code stations violating 
its standards. 
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The stated purpose of the code was "to maintain the highest 
possible programming and advertising standards" (NAB, Code Au­
thority,1980). This may have been a reasonable goal for an industry 
hoping to maintain- the goodwill ofa vast viewing and voting audience. 
The code also surely was designed to counter lobbying efforts by 
consumer groups and so forestall more restrictive and less flexible 
regulations imposed by the FCC. To quote the NAB: "The greater the 
numberofCode subscribers who support voluntary self-regulation, the 
more effective the industry and individual broadcasters will be in 
countering unnecessary and overly restrictive government controls" 
(NAB, Broadcasters' Working Together, n.d.). In this case, a successful 
code would benefit stations indirectly to the extent that actual code 
standards were less restrictive than potential FCC standards. Other 
possible indirect benefits of the code are discussed later in this article. 
The code might also have been intended to increase station profit 
directly. This possible (and unstated) purpose of the code would be to 
restrict output of advertising in the same way that colluding firms 
restrict output in an effort to increase industry profit. Media research­
ers like Owen, Beebe, and Manning (1974, pp. 101-111) acknowledge 
this potential purpose of the code and this possibility motivated the 
Justice Department suit. 
Reflecting trade association case law (Asch, 1983), Judge Greene 
ruled that code restrictions on multiple product announcements were 
illegal per see Greene chose to employ a rule of reason and evaluate the 
actual harm caused by the other provisions of the code. Fearing an 
adverse decision, the NAB eventually accepted a consent decree sus­
pending code commercial limits, leaving unanswered the question of 
the effect of the code's commercial limits. 
Data measuring the code's effect on television advertisers are 
unavailable. Also unavailable are data measuring changes in the actual 
number of commercials shown by stations or included in network 
programs. However, even if these data were available and showed that 
the code reduced the number of commercials, the code might not have 
been intended to increase profi t directly in a mannerconsistent with the 
sort of collusion addressed in the antitrust case. 
Critical evidence of the NAB's motivation for creating and enforc­
ing the code is whether the code directly increased broadcaster profit. 
The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate implications derived 
if the code was indeed successful as a direct collusive device. 
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Results 
If the primary purpose of the television code was to restrict the number 
of commercials in an effort to directly increase member station and 
network profit, the effects of such restrictions should be observable. 
Three of these effects are considered below, each in the form of an 
implication and a statistical test: 
Implication 1: Other factors held constant, the selling 
price of television stations should be higher in markets 
with a larger share of audience viewing code sub­
scriber stations. 
Like any other valuable asset, the price of a television station is the 
present value of current and anticipated profit: the difference between 
revenue and cost over time. A station's price reflects true economic 
profit, rather than accounting profit, and incorporates risk. The price 
is an inaccurate measure if markets for capital assets are inefficient and 
biased in one direction. In studying the television industry, Levin 
(1964, 1975) uses station sale price. Fournier and Martin (1983), Boyer 
and Wirth (1981), and Park, Johnson, and Fishman (1976) use station 
accounting data. FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff (1980) uses both 
accounting data and station sale price. Besen (1976) and Wirth and 
Wollert (1984) use commercial time prices. None of these authors 
include the NAB or its code in their models. 
Station revenue comes from sale of commercial time on programs 
and, for some network stations, payments from networks for showing 
network programs and commercials. The most important determinant 
of station revenue is audience size. The price a station charges adver­
tisers is directly related to the number of program viewers. Advertisers 
plan budgets based on the number of viewers exposed to a commercial 
and commercial contracts can contain provisions guaranteeing mini­
mum audience size. 
Audience size, in turn, is a function of the population in an area, the 
nature of competing programming, the presence of competition from 
cable systems, the station's programming, and characteri,stics of the 
station's signal. 
Station cost includes the largely fixed cost of equipment and 
transmission and the production costs for local programming. Stations 
assigned to UHF channels must employ transmitting equipment that is 
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more expensive to operate andthat produces a poorer signal with less 
range than VHF channels. Stations also buy some programming in the 
syndication market. Independent stations, in particular, must rely on 
less attractive syndicated programs. 
To directly increase station profit, a sufficientproportionof stations 
must reduce their quantity of commercials shown. If successful, the 
price of commercials and total revenue for all stations increases. Also 
require is an inelastic demand for commericals by advertisers, without 
which direct collusion serves no purpose. This assumption is common 
(see, for example, Koford, 1984). The higher the proportionofcode sub­
scribers, the higher will be profit for all stations in the market. 
Table 1. summarizes OLS regression results, thedependent variable 
being the prices of 96 U.S. commercial television stations sold between 
January 1976 and the code's suspension in March 1982. Prices are 
adjusted for different months of sale by the geometric mean annual 
Moody Aaa corporate bond yield. This adjustment should result in a 
measure of the station's true economic value by removing the impact of 
inflation and reflecting changes in the value of competing assets. Re­
sults are similar when station value is adjusted only for inflation. 
TABLE 1
 
REGRESSION RESULTS WITH STATION SALE PRICE
 
Const.ant Audience Codeshare Single R2
 
Equation 1 
1.51 0.186** -0.035 0.153 0.645 
(0.726) (12.63) (-1.410) (0.055) 
Equation 2 
1.56 0.186** -0.35 0.645 
(0.799) (12.88) (-1.46) 
Equation 3 
-0.827 .0.181** 0.636 
(~O.770) (12.82) 
"indicates significant at -one percent. n = 96. 
Student's t values are in parentheses. 
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The variable AUDIENCE is the number of households in the A.C. 
Nielsen designated market area viewing the station from 9:00 a.m. to 
midnight. SINGLE is a dummy variable set to one for stations in single 
station markets. CODESHARE is the proportion of television house­
holds in the market area viewing code subscriber station programs. 
Code membership is recorded six monthsafter the sale to allow time for 
adjustments in buyer behavior. Unless otherwise stated, data are re­
corded at time of sale. Appropriate variables are adjusted to November 
1979. 
The regressions shown in Table 1 exclude population, number of 
competing stations, channel number, network affiliation, and other 
factors of which audience size is a function. Also excluded are factors 
affecting station cost, channel number being an example. The reason 
these variables are excluded is that audience size is an effective proxy 
incorporating these and other factors, data for some of which are 
unavailable. When other available variables are included with audi­
ence size, coefficients on these other variables are dominated by audi­
ence size and so are statistically insignificant. Ifaudience size is omitted 
and the other variables included, the predictive value of the regression 
eql1ation falls. In any case, the coefficients on the critical CODESHARE 
and SINGLE variables are unaffected by alternate model specifications. 
See Foster and Hull (1986) for a complete treatment. 
The significant and positive coefficient on the AUDIENCE variable 
shows the importance of viewer households to station profitability. 
Possessing a monopoly television station gives no special advantage; 
the SINGLE variable coefficient is insignificant. The extentof television 
code subscription (CODESHARE) has no significant impact on station 
profit. If they are sufficiently more attra~tive to viewers, stations which 
conform to the code and reduce the quantity of commercials will have 
larger audiences, other things constan1. This might imply a multicollin­
earity problem. The extent of the problem depends on the response of 
total market audience (not station audience) to a change in the quantity 
of commercials produced by a sufficient share of stations (the variable 
CODESHARE). Researchers like Koford (1984) assert that total audi­
ence tends to remain relatively constant. ' 
The CODESHARE and SINGLE variables are omitted from the 
second and third equations without effect. Audience size influences 
station profit; a collusive code at the local level does not. 
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Implication 2: A smaller proportion of stations in 
single station markets should be code subscribers than 
in markets with two or more stations, other things 
being equal. 
If its objective is to directly increase station profit by reducing the 
quantity of commercials, the code is unnecessary in single station 
markets. Stations in single station markets are already monopolies and 
do not need the code to enforce appropriate monopoly behavior. 
Because the three major networks were code subscribers, network 
stations received network programs that conformed to code standards. 
However, stations have some ability to alter the quantity of commer­
cials in network programming. Stations can substitute commercials for 
public service and other announcements in network programming. 
Stations need not and do not clear all programming provided by their 
network. Network stations can control the number of commercials 
during the substantial periodsof time when networksare not providing 
programs. Thus network stations in single station markets need not 
conform to code standards and not all network stations are code 
subscribers. In November 1980, 72 percent of stations in multistation 
markets were code subscribers. By contrast, only 39 percent of stations 
in single station markets subscribed (Standard Rate and Data Service, 
1980). 
Although this result is consistent with a collusive code, stations in 
single station markets are fundamentally different from other stations. 
Thus, "other things" are not equal. In particular, stations in single 
station markets have fewer viewers than other stations. Let code 
membership be a dummy dependent variable. The independent vari­
ables are AUDIENCE and SINGLE (both defined above). As Table 2 
shows, probit analysis yields a coefficient on AUDIENCE asymptoti­
cally significant at 1 percent but an insignificant coefficient on SINGLE. 
The model predicts fifty-:-eight percent of the CODE outcomes. 
Stations in single station markets have fewer viewers than stations 
in multistation markets and stations with fewer viewers are less likely 
to subscribe to the code. If code subscription increases profit but 
stations with larger audiences are more likely to subscribe, a problem 
arises. The code causes and is a result of higher profit. Foster and Hull 
(1986) address this problem by employing a dummy endogenous 
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variable model. The model yields results consistent with those re- .
 
ported h~re. Stations are choosing to become code members for reasons
 
other than the potential for monopoly power. The key factor shown
 
here is audience size. Audience size may be indicative of how smaller
 
stationshave less reason to supportany public service or lobbyingchar­





PROBIT RESULTS WITH CODE MEMBERSHIP
 
Constant Audience Single 
Equation 1 0.303 0.015** -0.007 
(0.441) (3.22) (-0.013) 
"indicates asymptotically significant at one percent. n =96. 
Figures in parenthesis are the ratios of the coefficient and the asymptotic standard error, distributed 
nonnally for large samples. 
Implication 3: The rates of return on television broad­
cast industry stocks should fall when code enforce­
mentends. 
Returns on common stock in part reflect expectations about firm 
performance. If the television code significantly increased station 
profits, important events in the antitrust case should have reduced 
broadcastingcompany stock returns. Importantly, this measure should 
detect successful code-enforced commercial restrictions among the 
networks and in regional advertising markets in addition to the local 
markets analyzed in the previous implications. 
Stock prices will not indicate the value of the code if stock buyers 
expect stations to collude tacitly after the code is discontinued. In 1983, 
Alberto-Culver did bring suit against the NAB, one network, and 
several television station group owners claiming that these organiza­
tionswerecontinuing to refusemultiple-productannouncementsdespite 
the consent decree. Alberto-Culver did not accuse plaintiffs of tacit 
colIusion and excluded from the suit the other two networks and group 
owners (representing the majority ofstations) that did not maintain the 
restriction (Broadcasting, November 21/ 1283/ pp. 25-26). Tacit collusion 
seems not to have occurred. 
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Of course, stock returns are influenced by factors other than antici­
pated firm profits. To deal with these complications and to test the 
significance of changes in stock returns, researchers have developed a 
number of statistical techniqlJeS based on capital asset pricing models. 
Schwert (1981) reviews and updates these models. Binder (1985) also 
reviews the literature and makes some sophisticated additions. 
The basic model assumes that returns on a given stock Rjt are a 
linear function of returns on the market Rmt and some random error: 
Rjt= aj+~jRmt + ejt 
Market returns also contain a random element. The expected value of 
errors for a given firm is assumed to be zero. For each firm, errors are 
assumed to be uncorrelated and have constant variance. 
Ifan important event like an antitrust case is expected to change the 
returns on particular stocks, actual returns will deviate from those 
generated by the previous underlying function. The statistical tech­
nique involves estimating the underlying function over a base period 
well before the important event and using these parameters to estimate 
returns during a test period including the event. If theevent affects firm 
profitability, actual returns minus estimated returns (abnormal re­
turns) during the test period will differ significantly from zero. 
The daily returns including dividends on the common stocks of 
nine major broadcasting corporations are compiled from files main­
tained by the Center for Research in Securities Prices. The market 
return is the value-weighted stock return including dividends of all 
stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and is taken from the same 
source. The chosen companies are broadcasting firms or networks that 
own more than one television station, that are traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange, and for which complete data are available for the 
relevant periods. These firms were American Broadcasting Compa­
nies, CBS Inc., Capital Cities Communications, Cox Communications, 
Gannett, Liberty Corp., Metromedia, Storer, and Taft Broadcasting. 
Firms are excluded if they are a subsidiary of a non-broadcasting firm. 
NBC, for example, is owned by the RCA Corporation. 
Although the included firms often own other communications 
assets like cable television systems, the television broadcasting assets 
represent a substantial enough share of earnings that the model should 
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detect the impact of the antitrust case. The companies own television 
stations in the largest markets and stations representing smaller mar­
kets in all regions of the United States. As an aside, several of the firms 
now own more non-television assets than during the period of interest 
here. 
The particular statistical test employed here follows Linn and 
McConnell (1983). Daily stock returns and market returns for the 
period January 3, 1977, to January 3, 1978, are used to calculate nine sets 
of OLS parameters. These parameters in tum are used to estimate nine 
sets ofdaily returns for the test period. The test period starts on March 
10, 1982, when the NAB suspended enforcement of the code, and ends 
onJuly 30, 1982, two weeks after the proposed consent decree was filed. 
Actual returns for the test period are subtracted from estimated 
returns to determine abnormal returns. If the code enforced collusive 
restrictions, the antitrust case will generate negative abnormal returns. 
Average abnormal returns are calculated for each stock and added to 
average abnormal returns for the other stocks. The result is divided by 
the expected standard deviation of abnormal returns. The resulting 
statistic is normally distributed with mean zero for large samples. 
The cumulative abnormal average return (CAR) for the portfolio of 
nine broadcasting stocks is 0.457. The expected standard deviation 
S(AR) for the portfolio is 0.335. The resulting test statistic, Z = CARl 
S(AR) = 1.37, is not significantly different from zero and shows positive 
rather than negative excess returns. The returns on a portfolio of 
proadcasting stocks were not significantlyadverselyaffected by impor­
tant events in the antitrust case against the television code. 
The equations deriving the Z statistic testing the significance of 
cumulative average excess returns to broadcasting stocks follow Linn 
and McConnell (1983) in tum applying techniques in Fama (1976), 
Brown and Warner (1980), and DeGroot (1975). The statistic tests the 
null hypothesis that the cumulative average excess returns are signifi­
cantly different from zero. The statistic has an asymptotically normal 
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one. 
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The Z statistic is calculated as the following: 
Z = CAR I S(AR), 
N Q 
2CAR =(1 IN)L CARj , CA~ = (1/QI / ) L [ARjt/St(ARj)], 
j=l t=l 
ARjt= l\ -Rjt" = Rjt "" - (Clj + ~j Rmt), 
T
 
St(AR ) = (S j2[1 + liT + (R R )2 I L (R -R )2] )1/2,

j mt m mk m 
k=l 
S(AR) = [T-2 I N(T-4) ]1/2 
N =number of finns, in this case nine 
Q=number of trading days in test period, in this case 100 
j =a firm 
~ = observed daily returns on firm j's stock 
R =observed daily returns on the market 
1\-: estimated parameter 
5 j2 =variance of residuals from OLS regression for the base period 
orfinnj 
Rift =average daily return on the market during the base period 
T = number of trading days on the base period, in this case 253. 
The Purpose of the Code 
The evidence presented here strongly suggests that the NAB's Televi­
sion Code failed if its objective was to increase profit directly as would 
occur under ordinarycoIlusion. Inaddition, code membership in single 
versus multiple station markets appears to have been motivated by 
factors other than collusive profit maximization. 
These results are not surprising. Code subscription was voluntary 
and violation of code provisions was at worst (and rarely) punished by 
prohibiting a station from displaying its code membership medallion 
on station advertising or on the air. Commonly, the Code Authority 
used only verbal persuasion to discourage misbehavior. That the code 
was widely ignored is confirmed by a 1963 FCC staff study that showed 
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40 percent of stations exceeding code standards (Barnouw, 1970, pp. 
250-51). Code enforcement and compliance were problematic. 
The ability of the television code to increase station profit through 
colIusive restrictions was also being eroded bychanges in the broadcast 
industry. For one, cable television penetration was growing dramati­
callyduring the period of the antitrust case. Nationwide cable penetra­
tion increased from 19 percent to 46 percent in the years the NAB case 
was being argued and is now more than 51 percent ("By the Numbers," 
1988). 
Despite dissenting predictions by Noll, Peck, and McGowan (1973, 
pp. 151-182), cable has hurt major local stations. The benefit to a major 
local station from better signal reception is usually more than offset by 
the loss of viewers to the additional programs offered on cable (Web­
ster,1983). Smaller local stations gain viewers because of better signal 
reception, resulting in more competition for viewers and for advertis­
ing in the local market. An increase in the number of cable viewing 
options, some of which carry no commercials, also erodes the potential 
effectiveness of the code by increasing competition. 
From the above, it is clear that code success was problematic. 
However, even an effective code does not assure monopoly profit. In 
addition, an effective code might have side effects that benefit viewers. 
The argument is straightforward. The code only restricted the 
quantity of commercial material. Other programming dimensions 
were not controlled by the NAB and are in any case nearly impossible 
to measure meaningfully. In particular, stations have a competitive 
incentive to attract more viewers by increasing all of the dimensions of 
program quality, dimensions like signal strength, signal clarity, hours 
of operation, and characteristics of some programming (Fournier, 1985; 
Besen,1976; Owen,etal., 1974,pp.101-111). Anymonopolyprofitsdue 
to the code provided funds to support increases in quality, and compe­
tition pressures stations to use those funds. 
The effects of such actions are obvious. Cost increases eventually 
outweigh increases in audience size and potential monopoly profit is 
dissipated. The difficulty faced by all cartels in monitoring and control­
ling output is exacerbated in the television industryby the multidimen­
sional nature of programming. 
Possible improvement in program_quality is one (unintended) 
beneficial side effect of an effective restriction on the quantity of 
commercial material. Consumers also benefit more directly from 
successful restrictions. An effective code reduces the number of com­
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mercials. Althoughtelevision commercials may contain valuable infor­
mation, and some number of program interruptions certainly are 
desired by consumers, the typical consumer prefers fewer commercials 
on television. Research by Barnett (1966) and surveys by Steiner (1963) 
also supports this consumer attitude. Television viewer lobbying 
groups like Action for Children's Television recognized the potential 
disadvantages of the consent decree suspending code restrictions and 
even filed briefs opposing it. 
Although it might have had the unintended effect of benefiting 
consumers through improved program quality and reduced commer­
cial content, the statistical evidence suggests that the code did not 
achieve the collusive objective of raising station profit directly. Yet 
television stations voluntarily joined the code and the Code Authority 
took some pains to monitor and enforcecode standards. What purpose, 
then, might the code have served? 
As mentioned earlier in this article, one key function of the code 
surely was to counter lobbying efforts and the possibility of FCC 
regulation. Considering the statistical evidence against direct collu­
sion, this might have been the code's sole purpose. 
An additional objective of the code deserves mention, however. 
Code provisions that limit the number of commercials during a pro­
gram help assure advertisers that subscriber stations avoid the over­
commercialization that might dilute a given advertisers message. 
Information about the number of commercials a station shows is 
valuable to an advertiser, but costly for each advertiser to obtain 
independently about each station. In addition, each station has some 
incentive to misrepresent the actual number of commercials it shows 
and so earn extra revenue through overcommercialization. Although 
market forces provide some information and some protection against 
misbehavior, advertisers and honest stations would gain if a central 
organization monitored the quantity of commercial material and 
communicated this information. TheTelevision Code may have served 
this purpose. 
Note that in this case the code would not primarily restrict station 
behavior, but would advertise it. The Code Authority would not need 
any particular enforcement tools other than the ability to forbid non­
complying member stations from using the code seal. 
Advertising industry publications like Spot Television Rates and 
Data note code subscription along with other extensive information 
about each station. These publications are widely used by advertisers. 
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If it was included in advertiser publications, code membership infor­
mation must have been valuable. 
If the purpose of the code was to collusively restrict commercials 
and so directly raise station profit, stations hardly would have been 
inclined to advertise the restrictions to those who bought their product. 
Despite being made fully aware of the code and its menlber stations, 
advertisers did not bring suit against the Television Code (or the radio 
code) during the period before the Justice Department brought its case. 
For television, this represents the entire history of the industry. As 
mentioned, Alberto-Culver brought suit after the consent decree, al­
though the suit opposed only multiple-product provisions of the code 
and did not accuse stations of collusion. 
Conclusion 
The main objective of this article is to present statistical evidence that 
the National Association of Broadcasters' Television Code did not 
significantly directly increase station profit. Television station sale 
prices were no higher in markets with a high proportion of code 
subscriberstations. Stations in single stationmarkets were no less likely 
to subscribe to the code than stations with similar audience sizes in 
multiple-station markets. Finally, rates ofreturn onbroadcast firm and 
network stocks did not change when the antitrust case was settled. 
Regardless of its intent, the code was voluntary and could not control 
all programming dimensions. This information alone would have 
weakened the Justice Department case against the NAB had the case 
gone to trial under a rule of reason. 
Although the code appears not to have been an effective collusive 
device, even an effective code would have beneficial (albeit unin., 
tended) side effects. Television viewers prefer fewer commercials and 
gain by any increased program quality resulting from competition on 
non-controlled program dimensions. Finally, the code largely was 
designed to prevent more onerous FCC regulation and probably pro­
vided valuable information to advertisers about station commercial 
policies. 
Economic theory generally favors competitive markets but also 
recognizes that competitive markets may fail, especially in the case of 
products characterized by joint consumption. Television signals have 
this characteristic, and encouraging their optimal production may 
imply allowing some monopoly power. Had the antitrust case against 
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the NAB gone to trial, Judge Greene would have evaluated the code 
based on its effect on the advertising market in particularand society in 
general. This article suggests that the appropriate decision in the case 
was in favor of the NAB Code. Either the code was ineffective and thus 
harmless or it benefited consumers and advertisers. 
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